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Abstract—A long-standing research problem in security pro-
tocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with
tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this
problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,
which explicitly represents protocol execution states and state
transformations. Secondly, we develop an algorithm for verifying
security properties by utilizing the key ingredients of the first-
order reasoning for reachability analysis, while tracking state
transformation and checking the validity of newly generated
states. Our verification algorithm is proven to be (partially)
correct, if it terminates. We have implemented the proposed
framework and verification algorithms in a tool named SSPA,
and evaluate it using a number of stateful security protocols.
The experimental results show that our approach is not only
feasible but also practically efficient. In particular, we have found
a security flaw on the digital envelope protocol, which could not
be detected by existing security protocol verifiers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many widely used security protocols, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4],
keep track of the protocol execution states. These protocols
maintain a global state among several sessions and can be-
have differently according to the values stored in the global
state. More importantly, the protocol’s global state is tamper-
resistant, i.e., it cannot be simply cloned, faked, or reverted. As
the result, we cannot treat the global state as an input from the
environment so that the protocol becomes stateless. In practice,
such global states are usually extracted from trusted parties in
protocols like central trustworthy databases, trusted platform
modules (TPMs), etc.
The global state poses new challenges for the existing
verification techniques as discussed below. First, most ex-
isting verification tools, e.g., ProVerif [5] and Scyther [6],
are designed for stateless protocols. When they are used to
verify stateful protocols, false alarms may be introduced in
the verification results. For instance, when the protocol state is
ignored in these tools, a value generated in a later global state
can be used in a former global state. However, the execution
trace is actually impractical. Second, stateful protocols usually
have sub-processes that can be executed for infinitely many
times. However, the state-of-the-art tools, e.g., [5], [6], [7],
cannot handle loops. As a consequence, only a finite number
of protocol execution steps can be modeled and checked.
Therefore, valid attacks could be missed in the verification.
Even though some tools like Tamarin [8] can specify loops, the
verification cannot terminate for most stateful protocols as they
do not consider the states as tamper-resistant in the multiset
rewriting rules [9]. Third, some of the abstractions made in
the existing works tend to either make the verification non-
terminating for stateful protocols or introduce false alarms. For
instance, fresh nonces generated in ProVerif [5] are treated as
functions to the preceded behaviors in a session so that the
nonces with the same name could be merged under the same
execution trace. On one hand, if a stateful protocol receives
some data before generating any nonce in its session, the
nonce generated in one session can be received before the
same nonce is generated in a different session. According to
the abstraction method, the nonce becomes a function applied
to itself, which could lead to infinite function applications.
Thus the verification cannot terminate. On the other hand, if
a nonce is generated without performing any session-specific
behavior, then the nonce will be the same for multiple sessions.
The query of asking whether the nonce for a particular session
can be deduced may give false alarms, because the nonce that
can be deduced is actually coming from another session. As
these nonces are merged, they cannot be differentiated in the
verification process.
To address the above identified challenges for verifying
stateful security protocols, we first propose a protocol spec-
ification framework (see Section IV) that explicitly models
the protocol execution state as tamper-resistant. We specify
how states are used in the protocol as well as how states are
transferred. As a result, stateful protocols can be modeled in
our framework in an intuitive way. The protocol specification
is introduced with a motivating example of the digital envelope
protocol [4]. Second, a solving algorithm is developed to verify
stateful protocols. During solving, we apply a pre-order to the
states and converge the states into a valid state trace. The
secrecy property checked in this work is then formulated into
a reachability problem. The partial correctness of our method
is formally defined in Section IV-E and proved in Section V.
However, as the security protocol verification problem is
undecidable in general [10], our algorithm does not guarantee
the termination. The experiments show that our method can
terminate for many stateful security protocols used in the
real world. Third, we develop a tool named SSPA (Stateful
Security Protocol Analyzer) based on our approach. Several
stateful protocols including the digital envelop protocol and
the Bitlocker protocol [11] have been analyzed using SSPA.
The experiment results show that our method can both find
security flaws and give proofs efficiently. Particularly, we have
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found a security flaw in the digital envelope protocol which
has not been identified before.
Structure of the paper. Related works are discussed in
Section II and a motivating example is given in Section III. In
Section IV, we present our protocol specification framework
and describe how to specify cryptographic primitives, proto-
cols and queries. In Section V, we show how the verification
algorithm works and prove its partial correctness. We show
the implementation details and the experiment results in Sec-
tion VI. Finally, we conclude the paper with some discussions
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Mo¨dersheim developed a verification framework that works
with global states [12]. His framework extends the IF lan-
guage with sets and abstracts the names based on its Set-
Membership. According to [12], this method works well for
several protocols. However, its applicability in general is un-
clear since sets should be explicitly identified for the protocols
and no general solution for identifying the set is given in
the paper. Guttman extended the strand space with mutable
states to deal with stateful protocols [13], [14], but there is
no tool support for his approach. Our approach presented in
this paper is different from theirs, as the protocol specification
does not need to be changed in our framework and we provide
automatic tool support.
StatVerif is introduced by Arapinis et al. [7] to verify
protocol with explicit states. It extends the process calculus of
ProVerif [5] with stateful operational semantics and translates
the resulting model into Horn clauses. ProVerif is then used
as an engine to perform verification. Comparing with their
method that can only work with a finite number of (global)
states, our approach is more general and works for protocols
with infinite states.
In [15], Delaune et al. modeled TPMs with Horn clauses
and have verified three protocols using ProVerif. However, the
specifications need to be adapted according to the different
protocols under study. For instance, an additional parameter
is added into the global state when it is used for the digital
envelope protocol (DEP) [4] to prevent false attacks. More
importantly, they also modified the specification of the DEP
in a way that false negatives can happen (attacks are missing)
comparing with the original DEP proposed in [4]. This is
because their method does not work for infinite steps of
the stateful protocols. Specifically, they have constrained the
protocol so that its second phase is not repeatable. More
discussions on the DEP can be found in Section III. Notice
that all of the previous methods can only work with protocols
with finite steps. while this is not the case with our approach.
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We introduce the digital envelope protocol (DEP) [4] in this
section as a motivating example. Before going into the details
of the protocol, we give a brief introduction on the trusted
platform module (TPM) [16] used in the protocol first.
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Fig. 1: The digital envelope protocol (DEP)
TPM is an embedded cryptographic device proposed to give
higher level security guarantees than those can be offered by
software alone. Every TPM has several tamper-resistant plat-
form configuration registers (PCRs) that maintain the current
state of the TPM. The values stored in the PCRs can only be
extended. One possible implementation of extending a PCR
p with a value n could be extend(n){p = h(p, n)}, where
h is a one-way hash function applied to the concatenation of
p and n. Hence, the extending actions are irreversible unless
the TPM reboot is allowed (the PCRs are reset to the default
value b) and the previous extending actions are replayed in
an identical order. TPM provides several APIs to help the key
management, including key generation, key usage, etc., under
PCR measurement.
TPMs use several types of keys, including the attestation
identity keys (AIKs) and the warp keys. The AIK represents
the identity of the TPM in the protocol and can be used
for signing. In order to differentiate the TPMs, we assume
every TPM has a unique AIK. However, this assumption does
not prevent the adversary from using multiple AIK values as
he could initiate multiple TPMs. The warp keys form a tree
structure rooted under the permanent loaded storage root key
(SRK). We usually use two kinds of warp keys in the TMP, i.e.,
the binding keys and the storage keys. Data can be encrypted
with the binding public key remotely, or can be sealed with the
loaded storage key in the TPM. Typically, the TPM supports
the following operations.
• Extend. Extend the PCR value p by any value n to a new
PCR value h(p, n).
• Read. Read the current PCR value from the TPM.
• Quote. Certify the current PCR value.
• CreateWrapKey. Generate a warp key under a loaded
parent key and bind it to a specific PCR value. The new
key is not yet loaded into the TPM but stored in a key
blob, which is a storage place for holding the key.
• LoadKey2. Load the key into TPM by providing the key
blob and its parent key.
• CertifyKey. Certify a loaded key.
• UnBind. Decrypt the data with a loaded binding key. The
PCR value for the key should be matched.
• Seal. Encrypt the data with a storage key. The PCR value
for the key should be matched and the encrypted data can
be sealed to a particular PCR value.
• UnSeal. Decrypt the data with the loaded storage key.
The PCR value of the seal key, the PCR value of the
sealed storage and the current PCR value are required to
be the same.
As the storage key and seal/unseal operation are not used in the
DEP, we omit their specification in the following discussions.
By using TPMs, the DEP allows an agent Alice to provide
a digital secret s to another agent Bob in a way that Bob
can either access s without any further help from Alice, or
revoke his right to access the secret s so that he can prove
his revocation. This protocol consists of two phases as shown
in Figure 1. In the first phase, Alice generates a secret nonce
n and uses it to extend a given PCR in Bob’s TPM with an
encrypted session. The transport session is then closed. Since
the nonce n is secret, Bob cannot re-enter the current state of
the TPM if he makes any changes to the given PCR. In the
second phase, Alice and Bob read the value of the given PCR
as p and Bob creates a binding key pair 〈sk, pk〉 locked to the
PCR value h(p, open) and sends the key certification to Alice,
where open is an agreed constant in the protocol. This means
the generated binding key can be used only if the value open
is first extended to the PCR of value p. After checking the
correctness of the certification, Alice encrypts the data s with
her public key pk and sends it back to Bob. Later, Bob can
either open the digital envelope by extending the PCR with
open or revoke his right to open the envelope by extending
another pre-agreed constant revoke. If Bob revokes his right,
the quote of PCR value h(p, revoke) can be used to prove
Bob’s revoke action. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.
In fact, through our approach and the implemented tool, we
have found a cold-boot attack for this DEP when the TPM
reboot is allowed. According to the DEP proposed in [4],
the authors only mentioned that Bob may lose his ability to
open the envelope or to prove his revoke action if the TPM
reboot is allowed. To the best of our knowledge, this attack has
not been described before. We present the attack scenario in
Figure 2. When the TPM reboot is allowed, Bob can reboot his
TPM immediately after the first phase. As a consequence, the
secret nonce n extended to the given PCR is lost. When Alice
checks the PCR value in the beginning of the second phase,
she actually reads a PCR value that is unrelated to her previous
extend action. Hence, Bob can re-enter the current TPM state
by simply performing TPM reboot again. This attack is caused
by the fact that the PCR value in the second phase can be
unrelated to the PCR value in the first phase. On the other
hand, if the TPM reboot is not allowed, the secret nonce n
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Fig. 2: An attack on the DEP
could never get lost. So Alice can conduct the second protocol
phase for multiple times and the claimed properties of the DEP
are always preserved. In this way, if the TPM is maintained
by a trusted server and remotely controlled by both Alice and
Bob without the right to reboot TPM, this protocol is secure.
This protocol was previously verified in [15]. However, the
modifications made in [15] to the original DEP prevent the
authors from detecting the attack. In the modified version [15],
Bob always does the TPM reboot before the first phase and
Alice assumes that the PCR is h(b, n) without actually reading
the value in the beginning of the second phase. As a result,
TPM reboot can never happen before the second phase. The
reason why they need to make such modifications is because
ProVerif, which is used in their verification, can only model
finite protocol steps. Unfortunately, this makes it impossible
to find the attack as described in Figure 2. On the contrary, in
this work, we provide a framework where protocols like this
can be modeled faithfully and verified automatically.
IV. PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
In this section, we describe our specification framework for
modeling (stateful) protocols, crypto primitives and queries as
a set of first order logic rules with the protocol execution states
explicitly maintained. There are two categories of rules that
can be specified in our approach, i.e., state consistent rules
and state transferring rules. The state consistent rules specify
the knowledge deductions, while the state transferring rules
describe the state transitions. Since the protocol global state
is tamper-resistant, we assume that it can only be changed by
the state transition rules. The adversary model we consider in
this work is the standard active attacker, who can intercept
all communications, compute new messages and send any
messages that he can obtain or compute. For instance, he can
use all the public available functions including encryptions,
decryptions and etc. He can also ask the legitimate protocol
participants to take part in the protocol. That is, every rule
specified in the framework describes a logic capability of the
adversary. Our goal is to check whether he can deduce a target
fact or not.
A. Framework Overview
In our framework, every entity and device in the protocol
is treated as an object when it is tamper-resistant. Every
object have an object global state with a unique identity. The
protocol global state then consists of several object global
states. For simplicity, we name object global state after state
for short, and call protocol global state as protocol state in
the remaining of this paper. For instance, every TPM has a
state tpm(aik , p) which records the AIK value aik and the
PCR value p. The AIK value uniquely identifies the TPM.
Initially, the protocol state of DEP is {tpm(bob, p)}, where
bob stands for the AIK constant for Bob’s TPM. After the
first phase of the DEP, Alice enters a state alice(n) where
n is the secret value that she extends to Bob’s TPM. When
Alice obtains the state, she can initiate the second phase of the
protocol. Because Alice could start several sessions to Bob’s
TPM, we treat n as the identity of Alice’s state. When Alice
extends the nonce n to Bob’s TPM, the protocol state becomes
{tpm(bob, h(p,n)), alice(n)}. A protocol state can contain
several TPM states with different AIK values.
The states of the same object should be ordered in a timeline
of protocol execution, forming a state trace. For instance, the
following sequence of four states is a legitimate TPM state
trace in the DEP.
1) tpm(bob, i)
2) tpm(bob, h(i ,n))
3) tpm(bob, h(h(i ,n), x ))
4) tpm(bob, h(h(h(i ,n), x ), revoke))
The first state is the initial state. Then, in the first phase of
the DEP, Alice extends a secret nonce n into Bob’s TPM
(the second state). Later, Bob extends a value x into his
TPM for other purposes (the third state) and the second phase
of the DEP begins. At the beginning, Alice and Bob record
the PCR value as h(h(i, n), x). When Bob receives Alice’s
sealed secret, Bob extends the pre-agreed constant revoke to
revoke his right of opening the envelope (the fourth state).
In most protocols, one state can be used for multiple times.
For instance, in the above example, Bob needs to use the third
TPM state for several times to generate key, load key, generate
certifications and etc. As these states are actually the same,
we need to identify them as one state when they are used in
different places. On the other hand, the first state used in the
protocol is precedent to the third state. Thus, we should also
identify how states are updated, namely the transformation an
old state to a new state.
The protocol rules specified in our framework are of the
form H : M −[ S : O ]→ V . H is a set of premises such
as the terms that the adversary should know and the events
that the protocol should engage. S is a set of states. Both
of H and S must be satisfied so that the rule is applicable.
For example, when the adversary wants to load a key into the
TPM, the adversary should know its parent key and obtain the
TPM state with matched PCR value. V is the conclusion of
the rule with two types of values. One type of conclusion is a
fact. Take the TPM loading key as an example, its conclusion
is a fact that the adversary can get the loaded key in the
TPM. The other type of conclusion represents how the states
are transferred from old ones to new ones. As the states in
our framework are attached to the objects, the conclusion
consists of pairs of old state and new state for the same
object, denoting that state is converted from one to another. In
TPM extending operation, the conclusion is one pair of states
〈tpm(aik, p), tpm(aik, h(p, n))〉 in which the PCR value in
the second state is extended. M and O help us to organize
the correspondences between facts and states. M maps the
facts to the states indicating that the facts should be known at
which states. O is the orderings of the states generated from
the knowledge deduction. For instance, when a fact f required
by a rule R can be provided as the conclusion of another rule
R′, we can compose these two rules together to remove the
requirement of f . Since the f is provided by R′ and used
in R, the states mapped by f in R are required later than
requirement of the states in R′. The orderings are specified
in the verification process to make sure that the state trace is
practical for the protocol. We name the rule as state consistent
rule when V is a fact and call the rule as state transferring
rule when V is a set of state conversions.
In addition, we use events and states to distinguish the
protocol sessions. The events are engaged in the rule predicates
to indicate the generation of fresh nonces. Since fresh nonces
are random numbers, we assume their values can uniquely
identify the events. Whenever the nonces generated in different
events have the same value, these events should be merged.
On the other hand, the states are used to describe the objects
or entities presented in the protocol. Basically, we use states
to differentiate the different phases of the objects. As we do
not bound the number of events and states, the verification is
conducted for an infinite number of sessions.
B. Term Syntax
We adopt the syntax in Table I to model the protocols.
Before using an event or a state in the rules, we need to declare
it with a unique identity. For the nonce generation event, the
pair of the event name and the fresh nonce is the key1 and
we can merge two events if they have the same key. While
for states, the pair of the object name and the object identity
is the key and states with the same key should be ordered,
describing certain phases of the same object.
1Note that it is different from a cryptographic key.
Type Expression
Data(x) ∗n (key name)
n (message name)
Declaration(D) s(x1, x2, . . . , xn) (state type)
e(x1, x2, . . . , xn) (event type)
Term(t) f(t1, t2, . . . , tn) (function)
a[] (name)
[n] (nonce)
|g| (configuration)
v (variable)
State(s) s(t1, t2, . . . , tn) (state)
Fact(f ) k(t) (knowledge)
e(t1, t2, . . . , t2) (event)
Conversion(c) 〈s, s′〉 (state conversion)
Rule(R) f1, f2, . . . , fn :M −[ s1, s2, . . . , sm : O ]→
f (state consistent rule)
f1, f2, . . . , fn :M −[ s1, s2, . . . , sm : O ]→
c1, c2, . . . , ck (state transferring rule)
Accessibility(A) s(t1, t2, . . . , tn) (state instance)
TABLE I: Rule syntax hierarchy
Rules are used to specify the protocol execution and adver-
sary capabilities. They have the hierarchy structure as follows.
Terms could be defined as functions, names, nonces, configu-
rations or variables. Functions can be applied to a sequence of
terms; names are globally shared constants; nonces are freshly
generated values in the sessions; configurations are values pre-
existed in the states; and variables are memory locations for
holding the terms.
States describe object stages in the protocol by maintaining
a set of terms. If two states s and s′ have the same key, they are
describing the same object, denoted as s ∼ s′. The operator
∼ is an equivalence relation that can partition a state set into
several disjoint subsets. When a mutable value is encoded in
the state, we name it as configuration. It is different from
variables because its value is decided by the environment,
while the value of a variable is decided by the assignment
to the variable. In other words, configuration is pre-existed
while variable is post-assigned.
A fact can be the engagement of an event, or it means that
a term t is known to the adversary denoted as k(t). We define
mapping as a pair of fact f and state s denoted by 〈f, s〉,
representing that f is true at state s. Additionally, we define
state ordering by applying the binary operator ≤ over state
pairs: s ≤ s′, i.e., s should be a state used no later than s′.
The state set is a preorder set over ≤, and each ∼ partition
is a partially ordered set over ≤. The derivation of mappings
and orderings are discussed in Section V.
A conversion c is a pair of states 〈s, s′〉 which stands for the
transformation from an old state s to a new state s′. We call s
as the pre-state of c denoted as pre(c) and name s′ as the post-
state of c denoted as post(c). For a set of conversions C, we
have pre(C) = {pre(c)|c ∈ C} and post(C) = {post(c)|c ∈
C}. There are two kinds of rules that can be specified in
our framework as shown in the Table I. The state consistent
rule means if f1, f2, . . . , fn are true under the protocol state
s1, s2, . . . , sm satisfying the mappings M and the orderings O,
f is also true under the same state. For the state transferring
rule, it means if f1, f2, . . . , fn are true under the protocol
state {s1, s2, . . . , sm} ∪ pre(C) satisfying the mappings M
and the orderings O, the protocol state can be transferred into
{s1, s2, . . . , sm} ∪ post(C) where C = c1, c2, . . . , ck.
Assume H is a fact set, S and S′ are two state sets, we
define H × S = {〈f, s〉|f ∈ H, s ∈ S} and S × S′ = {s ≤
s′|s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′}. Given a rule H :M −[ S : O ]→ V directly
specified from the protocol, the predicates H should be given
at the exact states and all the states should be presented at
the same time. So the default value of M is H × S, and the
default value of O is S × S. In the remaining of the paper,
we omit them in the protocol specification.
C. Rule Modeling
In the following, we illustrate how to specify stateful
protocols in our approach by using the DEP described in
Section III as a running example. In the following protocol
specification, we assume that both of the first phase and the
second phase could be conducted for infinitely many times. We
assume that all of the values extended to Bob’s TPM in the first
phase and the secrets bound to the public key in the second
phase are freshly generated nonces. So we can differentiate the
sessions and values used in the sessions during the verification.
In order to clearly illustrate the modeling strategy employed
in our approach, we describe the basic functionalities of the
TPM along with the rules. Notice that our approach is not
limited to the applications of TPM, but potentially other
stateful security protocols.
1) Declarations: Before specifying the protocol, we need
to declare the events and the states that are used in the rules
and queries.
There are three nonce generation events in the DEP. The
genkey(∗sk , aik , p, pcr) event models that a new binding key
sk is generated in the TPM. In addition to the fresh key sk, the
genkey event also specifies the AIK value aik and the PCR
value p of the TPM when the key is generated. Moreover,
the pcr in the genkey event models the PCR value that sk
is bound to. The init(∗n, p) event is emitted when Alice
extends the nonce n to Bob’s TPM of the PCR value p. The
gensrt(∗s, p, pkey) event is engaged when Alice creates the
secret s for a new session of the second phase after receiving
a key certification of pkey issued from Bob’s TPM with the
PCR value p.
In terms of the protocol states, Alice enters the state
alice(∗n) after she extends the secret nonce n to Bob’s TPM.
Alice also maintains the state secret(∗s, p, pkey) when she
decides to share the secret value s over Bob’s TPM with the
PCR value p. The pkey is a public key generated from Bob’s
TPM, locked to PCR h(p, open[]). Beside, every TPM has a
state of tpm(∗aik , p) in which the TPM is identified by the
AIK value aik and it has the PCR value p.
2) State Consistent Rules: The rules in the first category
preserves the protocol execution state. However, they can be
applied only if the protocol is in some specific states. Most of
the rules related to the TPM fall into this category.
Stateless Rules. Some stateless operations are allowed in
stateful protocols such as encryption, decryption, concate-
nation and etc. For instance, public key generation and the
binding operation of the TPM can be modeled as
k(skey) −[ ]→ k(pk(skey)) (1)
k(mess), k(pkey) −[ ]→ k(aenc(mess, pkey)) (2)
where the state set is empty in these rules. Rule (1) means
that if the adversary knows a term skey , he could treat it
as a private key and compute its corresponding public key
pk(skey). Rule (2) models the binding operation happened
outside of the TPM, which means if the adversary knows
a message mess and a binding public key pkey , he could
encrypt mess by pkey and get the asymmetric encryption
aenc(mess, pkey). As stateless protocols can be considered a
special case of stateful protocols, our verification framework
also works for stateless protocols. Other two stateless rules in
the DEP model the fact that the agreed constant values open
and revoke are known publicly.
−[ ]→ k(revoke[]) (3)
−[ ]→ k(open[]) (4)
Data Fetch Rules. Another category of the state consistent
rules contains the data fetch rules. They model the fact that
some data used in the protocol can be fetched directly from
the protocol state without other information. In the DEP, the
adversary has control over the TPM. First of all, he can use
the the storage root key (SRK) to encrypt any messages. In
addition, he can ask the TPM for its PCR value and its PCR
quote without providing any information. To specify a general
case of the TPM, the AIK value is not fixed to Bob’s TPM.
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(srk(|aik |)) (5)
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(|p|) (6)
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(pcrcert(|aik |, |p|)) (7)
As srk(|aik |) represents the SRK itself rather than its value,
rule (5) means that the adversary has access to the SRK. Rule
(6) and (7) stand for getting the PCR value and the PCR quote,
respectively. PCR quote is a certification issued from the TPM
that can be used to prove its PCR value.
Data Processing Rules. The third category of the state
consistent rules contains data processing rules, which process
data based on the presented information and the protocol state.
As we have illustrated in Section III, the keys used in the TPM
are well protected and strictly controlled. In the TPM, keys can
only be generated under a parent key, and the generated key
can be bound to a specific PCR value so that it can be used
only if the given PCR is of that value. In the DEP, for the sake
of simplicity, we assume all the new keys are generated from
the SRK. Additionally, all the new keys are bound to a specific
PCR value as it is the case for the protocol. Notice that our
technique does not restrict us from specifying the complete
TPM.
k(pcr), k(srk(|aik |)), genkey([sk ], |aik |, |p|, pcr)
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→
k(〈pk([sk ]), blob(|aik |, [sk ], srk(|aik |), pcr)〉) (8)
k(blob(|aik |, sk , pakey , pcr)), k(pakey)
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(pcrkey(|aik |, sk , pcr)) (9)
k(pcrkey(|aik |, sk , pcr))
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(keycert(|aik |, pk(sk), pcr)) (10)
k(aenc(data, pk(sk))), k(pcrkey(|aik |, sk , |p|))
−[ tpm(|aik |, |p|) ]→ k(data) (11)
Rule (8) specifies that a new session key sk can be generated
in the TPM identified by aik with PCR value p. In addition,
the new key is bound to the PCR value pcr so that it can
only be used when the PCR is of that value. As can be seen
from rule (8), we need to specify the target PCR value for
the key and provide the SRK as well. In addition, all of the
related information should be encoded into the key generation
event so that it can be used to identify the key generation
behavior. Initially, the generated key is not loaded into the
TPM but stored in a key blob. So rule (9) models the key
loading operation by providing the key blob and its parent key.
When the key is loaded, the TPM can issue key certification
as illustrated in rule (10). Rule (11) describes the bound data
can be decrypted with the corresponding loaded key. More
importantly, the PCR value specified in the key should be
matched with the current PCR.
When Alice receives key certification from Bob and she
has already finished the first phase, she generates a secret [s],
encrypts it with the public key pkey and sends it to Bob.
gensrt([s], p, pkey),k(keycert(bob[], pkey , h(p, open[])))
−[ alice(|n|) ]→ k(aenc([s], |pkey |)) (12)
3) State Transferring Rules: The state transferring rules
change the protocol’s global state. The PCR value extending
action is modeled as follows.
k(n) −[ ]→ 〈tpm(|aik |, |p|), tpm(|aik |, h(|p|,n))〉 (13)
Rule (13) means that if the adversary knows a value n, he
could extend the given PCR in the TPM by n. The second
state transition rule models the first phase for Alice.
init([n], |p|) −[ ]→ 〈, alice([n])〉,
〈tpm(bob[], |p|), tpm(bob[], h(|p|, [n]))〉 (14)
The constant bob[] is the AIK value of Bob’s TPM. Alice enters
a state called alice after Alice confirms that the nonce n is
extended to Bob’s TPM. Meanwhile, the nonce n is extended
to Bob’s TPM as described in the protocol. After the alice
state is presented, Alice could repeatedly conduct the second
phase of the protocol for infinitely many times.
The optional rule (15) below specifies the reboot behavior
of the TPM.
−[ ]→ 〈tpm(|aik |, |p|), tpm(|aik |, boot [])〉 (15)
In this work, we prove that the digital envelope protocol is
secure when the TPM reboot is disallowed. We also show that
this protocol is subject to attack otherwise.
D. Accessibility
Besides the rules, we also need to specify the object
accessibilities for the adversary. The accessibility describes
the objects the adversary have access to. So given a state in
a rule, we can decide whether the states can be accessed by
the adversary or not. For instance, in the DEP, the adversary
can access Bob’s TPM, and he can use additional TPMs to
process messages if necessary.
access tpm(bob[], |p|)
access tpm(|aik |, |p|)
We match the state patterns by substituting the terms in the
states. We discuss more details about accessibility and pattern
matching in Section V-B.
E. Query
In this paper, we focus on reachability properties such as
secrecy. For instance, we want to ensure that Bob cannot
open the secret s as well as obtain the proof for his revoke
action certpcr(bob[], h(p, revoke[])) at the same time for any
iteration secret(s, p, pkey) in the DEP. If he can, it means that
Bob can cheat in the protocol. We add supplementary rules
to represent whether the adversary has the ability to obtain
certain terms as events, such that we could simply check if
those events are reachable or not.
We need to first add another state transferring rule when
we want to check reachability. This rule models that Alice has
indeed accepted the certification of the key.
gensrt([s], p, pkey),k(keycert(bob[], pkey , h(p, open[])))
−[ alice(|n|) ]→ 〈, secret([s], p, pkey)〉 (16)
The queries are generally state consistent rules, but they
have event conclusions. In the DEP, we are interested in the
reachability properties as follows.
gensrt([s], |p|, |pkey |), k([s])
−[ secret([s], |p|, |pkey |) ]→ opened() (17)
gensrt([s], |p|, |pkey |), k(pcrcert(bob[], h(|p|, revoke[])))
−[ secret([s], |p|, |pkey |) ]→ revoked() (18)
gensrt([s], |p|, |pkey |), k(pcrcert(bob[], h(|p|, revoke[])))
, k([s]) −[ secret([s], |p|, |pkey |) ]→ attack() (19)
The first query (rule 17) means that Bob can open the envelope
and extract the nonce [s]. Similarly, the second query (rule 18)
means that the PCR quote can be issued from the TPM if Bob
chooses to revoke the right of opening the envelope. The third
query (rule 19), the most interesting one, checks whether Bob
can get the value of the nonce [s] as well as the proof for his
revoke action from his TPM at the same time. As can be seen,
we can name the events differently and check several queries
at the same time.
Because verification for security protocol is generally un-
decidable, our algorithm cannot guarantee termination. Hence
we define correctness under the condition of termination
(partial correctness) as follows. In Section V, we present our
verification algorithm on reachability checking, together with
its partial correctness proofs.
Definition 1 (Partial Correctness). A verification algorithm is
partially sound if and only if the target event is reachable
when the algorithm can terminate and claim that the event
is reachable. It is partially complete if and only if the target
event is unreachable when the algorithm can terminate and
claim that the event is unreachable.
V. VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
After a protocol is correctly specified (as illustrated in
Section IV), we present how to verify the protocol in details in
this section. During the verification, we divide our algorithm
into two phases. The first phase is targeted at constructing a
knowledge searching base by knowledge forward composition
and state backward transformation. Based on the knowledge
base, we could then perform query searching to find valid
attacks in the second phase.
In order to verify security protocols, the verification algo-
rithm needs to consider all possible behaviors of the adversary.
Because the adversary adopted in this work can generate new
names dynamically at runtime, the verification process cannot
be conducted in a straightforward manner. To guide the attack
searching procedure so that it can terminate, we adopt a similar
strategy as proposed in [5] that applies to the Horn theory.
Our algorithm can be briefly described as follows. Recall
that a rule of the form H : M −[ S : O ]→ V says that
the V is true when all the predicates in H are satisfied and
all the states S are presented under the restrictions of state
mappings M and orderings O. On one hand, if a predicate in
a rule is not yet satisfied, we try to use a state consistent rule’s
conclusion to fulfill it by rule composition. However, if the
predicate is a singleton, that is a fact of the form k(v) where
v is a variable, and the value of v is not related to other facts
in the rule, the singleton could be automatically fulfilled as
the adversary assumed in our paper can generate new names.
Additionally, events are not unifiable in our framework as the
events in the predicates and the conclusions are different. Thus
we reserve a set of facts N from unifying with other facts.
In this work, N consists of events and singletons. On the
other hand, if several states are presented in a rule, some of
the states should be the latest ones that are presented when the
conclusion is given, while others are the outdated states. Thus,
we identify the latest states and deduce them to their previous
states with the help of rule transformation. By performing the
rule composition and rule transformation iteratively, once the
fixed-point can be reached for the knowledge base, the query
can then be answered directly from the rules in the knowledge
base.
A. Knowledge Base Construction
In this section, we compose existing rules to generate new
rules until the fixed point of the searching knowledge base
is reached. Basically, when we compose two rules together,
the term encoded in the conclusion of the first rule should be
unifiable with the term in a predicate of the second rule. We
use the most general unifier to unify the terms.
Definition 2 (Most General Unifier). If σ is a substitution for
both terms t1 and t2 so that σt1 = σt2, we say t1 and t2
are unifiable and σ is a unifier for t1 and t2. If t1 and t2 are
unifiable, the most general unifier for t1 and t2 is a unifier σ,
where for all unifiers σ′ of t1 and t2 there exists a substitution
σ′′ such that σ′ = σ′′σ.
The unification of the facts is defined if and only if their
predicate names are matched and the corresponding terms in
the facts can be unified. According to Section IV, we have two
kinds of rules in our framework, i.e., state consistent rules and
state transferring rules. State consistent rules have a fact as
conclusion, so given an unsatisfied predicate in a rule, we can
compose the state consistent rule to it to provide the predicate.
The rule composition is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Rule Composition). Let R = H : M −[ S :
O ]→ f be a state consistent rule and R′ = H ′ : M ′ −[
S′ : O′ ]→ V be either a state consistent rule or a state
transferring rule. Assume there exists f0 ∈ H ′ such that f
and f0 are unifiable with the most general unifier σ. Given
S0 = {s0|〈f0, s0〉 ∈ M ′}, the rule composition of R with R′
on the fact f0 is defined as
R ◦f0 R′ = σ(H ∪ (H ′ − {f0})) : σ(M ∪M ′)
−[ σ(S ∪ S′ : O ⊕O′ ⊕ S × S0) ]→ σV.
Example 1. For instance, given two simplified rules as fol-
lows. We omit the mappings and orderings when they are
trivial and use special characters (e.g., ♠, ) to indicate the
facts and states in the mappings and orderings.
gensrt([s], |p|, pkey) −[ tpm(bob[], h(|p|, open[]))♠ ]→ k([s])
gensrt([s], |p|, pkey), [s] : {〈,♣〉}
−[ tpm(bob[], h(|p|, revoke[]))♣ ]→ attack()
The first rule means that the secret s can be revealed when
Bob’s TPM has the PCR value h(p, open[]). The second rule
means if Bob’s TPM has the PCR value h(p, revoke[]) and the
secret s is revealed (the envelope is opened), we have found
an attack. Their rule composition on the fact f0 = k([s]) is
gensrt([s], |p|, pkey) −[ tpm(bob[], h(|p|, open[]))♠,
tpm(bob[], h(|p|, revoke[]))♣ : ♠ ≤ ♣ ]→ attack() (20)
which means that open[] should be extended to Bob’s TPM
before revoke[] is extended. This is apparent because the last
state of Bob’s TPM, according to the rules, should have
revoke[] extended.
Given a state consistent rule with a conclusion f , it specifies
that we can obtain f if its predicates are provided and the
states form a valid state trace. Furthermore, some of the states
are the latest states when the conclusion is given. Among the
latest states, the latest state transformation is taken on some of
them. If we can identify those latest states for the latest state
transformation, we then can deduce their precedent states using
the corresponding state transferring rule. We define S0 as the
cover set of S if s0 ∈ S0, s ∈ S, s0 ≤ s then s ∈ S0. Assume
c is a conversion and post(c) is unifiable with a state s under
σ, we define the join operator c ./σ s = σpre(c). Besides, we
define [s]S as the ∼ partition of s in the state set S. The state
transformation is then defined as follows.
Definition 4 (State Transformation). Let R = H : M −[ S :
O ]→ C be a state transferring rule and R′ = H ′ : M ′ −[
S′ : O′ ]→ f be a state consistent rule. Assume there exists
a unifier σ′ and an injective function m : C → P(S′) such
that ∪c∈Cσ′m(c) is a cover set of ∪c∈C [σ′post(c)]σ′S and
∀c ∈ C,∀s ∈ m(c), c ./σ′ s is defined. Let σ be the most
general unifier of σ′ and Sn = σS′ − post(σC), the state
transformation of applying R to R′ on m is defined as
R ./m R
′ = σ(H ∪H ′) : σ(M ∪M ′) −[ σS ∪ Sn ∪ pre(σC)
: σO ⊕ σO′ ⊕ pre(σC)× pre(σC)⊕ (⊕c∈C(([σpre(c)]σS
− σm(c))× σpre(C)⊕ σpre(C)× σm(c))) ]→ σf.
Example 2. For instance, if the PCR value extending rule
(13) is used for transferring the states in rule (20), we first
enumerate the state cover set of rule (20) as {♣}, {♠,♣}.
Because the states of {♠,♣} cannot be unified, we have only
one valid rule after the state transformation.
gensrt([s], |p|, pkey), k(revoke[]) −[tpm(bob[], |p|)♥,
tpm(bob[], h(|p|, open[]))♠ : ♠ ≤ ♥ ]→ attack()
Since the new generated rule has an unsatisfied predicate that
is not in N , the verification algorithm continues. However,
when TPM reboot is disallowed, these two states remained in
the rule can never be unified to one state, so the attack event
cannot be reached. The detailed discussions are available in
the reachability analysis.
The adversary can generate new names. If a singleton
predicate is not related to other facts in a rule, the adversary
could generate a random fact and use it as the singleton
predicate so that it can be removed from the predicates. In
addition, given two events with the same key in the predicates,
they should be unified and merged. Furthermore, for any two
states s ∼ s′ and s ≤ s′ ∧ s′ ≤ s ∈ O, they should be
merged because clearly they are the same state. Meanwhile,
any mappings and orderings related to the non-existing facts
and states should be removed as well.
Definition 5 (Rule Validation). Let R = H : M −[ S : O ]→
V be a rule. We define a rule as valid if and only if there
exists a unifier σ′ such that any event in H under the same
key is unifiable with σ′. Let σ be the most general unifier of
σ′, The rule validation of R is defined as
R ⇓=clear(merge(σH : rm(σM)))
−[ elim(σS : rm(σO)) ]→ σV
The function merge merges duplicated expressions; the func-
tion clear removes any singleton in which the variable does
not appear in other facts in the rule; the function elim
eliminates any isolated states and those related orderings; and
the function rm removes the mappings and orderings related
to no longer existed facts and states.
When a new rule is composed from existing ones, we need
to make sure it is not redundant. Suppose two rules R and
R′ can make the same conclusion, while (1) R requires less
predicates, mappings and orderings than R′ and (2) R is no
less general than R′, R′ should be implicated by R. The joint
operator ‘·’ between mapping M and ordering O is defined as
M ·O = {〈f, s〉|〈f, s′〉 ∈M ∧ s′ ≤ s ∈ O}.
We then define rule implication as follows.
Definition 6 (Rule Implication). Let R = H : M −[ S :
O ]→ V and R′ = H ′ : M ′ −[ S′ : O′ ]→ V ′ be two rules.
We define R implies R′ denoted as R ⇒ R′ if and only if
∃σ, σV = V ′ ∧ σH ⊆ H ′ ∧ σ(M · O) ⊆ (M ′ · O′) ∧ σS ⊆
S′ ∧ σO ⊆ O′.
The knowledge base construction algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1, where we use Binit to denote the initial set of
rules as specified and use B to denote the knowledge base
constructed by the algorithm. In the following discussions, we
will use B and Binit directly assuming they are clear from the
context.
In the add procedure (Line 1 to Line 6), we use rule
implication to ensure that redundancies will not be introduced
into the knowledge base. The main procedure, starting at Line
7, first adds all the initial rules into the knowledge base (Line
8 to Line 11), then it composes and transforms the rules until
a fixed point is reached. We discuss the rule composition and
the state transformation separately as follows.
For the rule composition (Line 13 to Line 20), when rules
can be composed in an unlimited method, infinitely many
composite rules can be generated, which we shall prevent.
For instance, we can compose the rule (1) to itself by treating
the public key as a valid private key and the composite rule
becomes k(skey) −[ ]→ k(pk(pk(skey))), which could then
be composed to the rule (1) again. Furthermore, as mentioned
previously, singleton predicates that are not related to other
facts in the rule can be removed, thus it is unnecessary to
compose two rules on a singleton fact. As the rules cannot
compose on events, when two rules are composed in our
algorithm, we need to ensure that they can be composed on
a fact f0 such that f0 6∈ N . Moreover, when two rules are
composed in the form of R◦f0R′ and R has predicates which
Algorithm 1: Knowledge Base Construction
Input : Binit - initial rules
Output: B - knowledge base
1 Procedure add(R, rules)
2 for Rb ∈ rules do
3 if Rb ⇒ R then return rules;
4 if R⇒ Rb then rules = rules − {Rb};
5 end
6 return {R} ∪ rules;
7 Algorithm
8 rules = ∅;
9 for R ∈ Binit do
10 rules = add(R, rules);
11 end
12 repeat
13 Case 1.
14 Select a state consistent rule R = H −[ S : O ]→ f
15 and a general rule R′ = H ′ −[ S′ : O′ ]→ V
16 from rules such that
17 1. ∀p ∈ H : p ∈ N ;
18 2. ∃f0 : f0 6∈ N ;
19 3. (R ◦f0 R′) ⇓ is valid;
20 rules = add((R ◦f0 R′) ⇓, rules);
21 Case 2.
22 Select a state transferring rule R = H −[ S : O ]→ C
23 and a general rule R′ = H ′ −[ S′ : O′ ]→ f
24 from rules such that
25 1. ∀p ∈ H ∪H ′ : p ∈ N ;
26 2. f is an event;
27 3. ∃m, (R ./m R′) ⇓ is valid;
28 rules = add((R ./m R
′) ⇓, rules);
29 until fix-point is reached;
30 Bv = rules;
31 return B = {R ∈ rules|∀p ∈ predicates(R), p ∈
N ∧ conclusion(R) is an event};
are not contained in N , we should fulfill those predicates first.
Thus we ensure that R’s predicates are all in N .
For the state transformation (Line 21 to Line 28), as we
deduce the states in a backward manner, we should make sure
that the states we transferred in the rule are latest, and the
target event is presented in the rule conclusion. In addition,
its predicates should be all contained in N , resulting from the
same reason mentioned previously.
Finally, we select a subset of the rules. Their predicates
should only be singletons and events as rules with unfulfilled
predicates cannot be used to conduct attacks directly. Their
conclusion should be an event because these rules are the only
interesting rules to us. Bv is introduced in Line 30 to help the
explanation of the proof for Theorem 1.
Previously, we have reformulated our verification problem
as reachability analysis of events (see Section IV-E). Whenever
an event is derivable from the initial rules Binit, there must
exist a derivation tree for that event defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Derivation Tree). Let B be a set of closed rules
and e be an event, where the closed rule is a rule with its
conclusion initiated by its predicates and states. e can be
derived from B if and only if there exists a finite derivation
tree defined as follows.
Rhf1, S, ii hf2, S, ii hfn, S, ii
hf, S, ji
i = j
(a) State Consistent Rule
R
hf1, S, ii hf2, S, ii hfn, S, ii
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hf, S, ii
i = j + 1
(b) State Transferring Rule
Fig. 3: Rule in derivation tree
1) Every edge in the tree is labeled by a fact f , a state set
S and an index i, and ∀s, s′ ∈ S we have s 6∼ s′.
2) Every node is labeled by a rule in B.
3) Suppose the node is labeled by a state consistent rule
as shown in Figure 3a, then we have R ⇒ H : M −[
S : O ]→ f in which H = f1, . . . , fn, M = H × S,
O = S×S and the indexes labeled on the outgoing edge
and incoming edges are the same.
4) On the other hand, if the node is labeled by a state
transferring rule as shown in Figure 3b, there exists C
such that R ⇒ H : M −[ S0 : O ]→ C in which
H = f1, . . . , fn, S0 = S − pre(C) = S′ − post(C),
M = H × S0, O = S0 × S0 and the indexes labeled
on the incoming edges equal to the index labeled on the
outgoing edge plus 1.
5) The outgoing edge of the root is labeled by the event e
and the index 1.
6) The incoming edges of the leaves are only labeled by
facts in N with the same index.
7) The edges with the same index have the same state.
In the tree, every node is labeled by a rule in Binit to
represent how the knowledge is deduced. Additionally, we
label the edges with states to indicate when the knowledge
deduction rule is applied and how the state transferring rule
affects the states. Furthermore, we also label every edge with
an index to group the knowledge under the same state together
as well as to denote the valid trace of state transferring, which
eases the proof of Theorem 1.
The Lemma 1 demonstrates how to replace two directly
connected nodes in the derivation tree with one node labeled
by a composite rule with the same state and the same index.
Lemma 1. If Ro ◦f R′o is defined, Rt ⇒ Ro and R′t ⇒ R′o,
then either there exists f ′ such that Rt ◦f ′ R′t is defined and
Rt ◦f ′ R′t ⇒ Ro ◦f R′o, or R′t ⇒ Ro ◦f R′o.
Proof. Let Ro = Ho : Mo −[ So : Oo ]→ fo, R′o = H ′o :
M ′o −[ S′o : O′o ]→ Vo, Rt = Ht : Mt −[ St : Ot ]→ ft, R′t =
H ′t : M
′
t −[ S′t : O′t ]→ Vt. There should exist a substitution
σ such that σft = fo, σHt ⊆ Ho, σMt ⊆ Mo, σSt ⊆ So,
σOt ⊆ Oo, σf ′t = f ′o, σH ′t ⊆ H ′o, σM ′t ⊆M ′o, and σS′t ⊆ S′o,
σO′t ⊆ O′o. Assume So◦fS′o = σ′(Ho∪(H ′o−{f})) : σ′(Mo∪
M ′o) −[ σ′(So ∪ S′o) : σ′(Oo ∪ O′o ∪ So × S) ]→ σ′Vo where
S = {s|〈f, s〉 ∈M ′o}. We discuss the two cases as follows.
First case. Suppose ∃f ′ ∈ H ′t such that σf ′ = f . Since
Ro ◦f R′o is defined and σ′f = σ′fo, we thus have σ′σf ′ =
σ′σft. As f ′ and ft are unifiable, St ◦f ′ S′t is defined. Let σt
be the most general unifier, then ∃σ′t such that σ′σ = σ′tσt.
Suppose we have St ◦f ′ S′t = σt(Ht∪ (H ′t−{f ′})) : σt(Mt∪
M ′t) −[ σt(St ∪ S′t) : σt(Ot ∪ O′t ∪ St × S′) ]→ σtVt where
S′ = {s|〈f ′, s〉 ∈ M ′t}. First we prove σS′ = {s|〈σf ′, s〉 ∈
σM ′t} = {s|〈f, s〉 ∈ σM ′t} ⊆ {s|〈f, s〉 ∈ M ′o} = S. Since
σ′tσt(Ht ∩ (H ′t − {f ′})) = σ′σ(Ht ∪ (H ′t − f ′)) ⊆ σ′(Ho ∪
(H ′o − {f})), σ′tσt(St ∪ S′t) = σ′(σSt ∪ σS′t) ⊆ σ′(So ∪ S′o),
σ′tσt(Ot ∪ O′t ∪ St × S′) = σ′(σOt ∪ σO′t ∪ σSt × σS′) ⊆
σ′(Oo∪O′o∪So×S), σ′tσt((Mt∪M ′t) ·(Ot∪O′t∪St×S′)) ⊆
σ′((Mo ·M ′o)∪ (Oo ∪O′o ∪ So × S)), and σ′tσtVt = σ′σVt =
σ′Vo, we have Rt ◦f ′ R′t ⇒ Ro ◦f R′o.
Second case. σH ′t ⊆ H ′o − {f}, then σ′σH ′t ⊆ σ′(Ho ∪
(H ′o − {f})), σ′σ(M ′t · O′t) ⊆ σ′(M ′o · O′o) ⊆ σ′(Mo · Oo ∪
M ′o · O′o), σ′σS′t ⊆ σ′S′o ⊆ σ′(So ∪ S′o), σ′σO′t ⊆ σ′O′o ⊆
σ′(Oo ∪ O′o ∪ So × S), and σ′σVt = σ′Vo. Therefore R′t ⇒
Ro ◦f R′o.
Theorem 1. Any event e that is derivable from the initial rules
Binit if and only if it is derivable from the knowledge base B
constructed in Algorithm 1.
Proof. Only if. Assume the event e is derivable from Binit,
then there should exist a derivation tree Ti for e and every
node in the tree is labeled by a rule in Binit. According to
the add function in Algorithm 1, a rule is removed only if
it is implied by another rule, so we have ∀R ∈ Binit,∃R′ ∈
Bv, R′ ⇒ R, where Bv appears at the line 30 in Algorithm 1.
Hence, we can replace all the rules labeled on tree with the
rules in Bv and get a new derivation tree Tv . As can be seen
from Algorithm 1, some rules are filtered out from Bv to B, so
we need to further prove that the nodes in Tv can be composed
and transformed until a derivation tree T is formed such that
all the rules labeled on T are rules in B.
To continue the proof, we consider Tv purely as a tree
structure, and each tree consists of a root and several connected
sub-trees. Next, we prove that each sub-tree is implied by a
state consistent rule in Bv . Since the leaves of Tv are implied
by the state consistent rules, the sub-trees of the leaves are
directly implied by rules in Bv . Given two nodes n and n′,
n’s outgoing edge f is one of incoming edges of n′. Assume
the subtree n is implied by a state consistent rule R in Bv , the
node n′ is labeled by a rule R′ and n′ has a outgoing edge of
f ′.
• If f 6= f ′, we have R ⇒ H : M −[ S : O ]→ f ,
R′ ⇒ H ′ : M ′ −[ S′ : O′ ]→ V and f ∈ H ′. Since
Rf = (H : M −[ S : O ]→ f) ◦f (H ′ : M ′ −[ S′ :
O′ ]→ V ) is defined, according to Lemma 1, the sub-
tree n′ is also implied by a rule in Bv in two cases.
In the first case, there exists f ′′ in the predicates of R′,
R◦f ′′R′ ⇒ Rf . If f ′′ is not a singleton, because Bv is the
fixed-point of Algorithm 1, there should exist R′′ ∈ Bv
such that R′′ ⇒ Rf . So we can merge these two nodes
in the tree and the proof continues. Otherwise, i.e., f ′′
is a singleton, we can detach the sub-tree of n from tree
Tv temporarily. With the composition and transformation
processing, f ′′ may be unified to a non-singleton fact,
so the composition could continue. If the other part of
the tree has been processed and f ′′ is still a singleton,
we will prove later that n can be removed from the tree
and the derivation tree is still valid. In the second case,
we can remove the node n and link its incoming links
directly to n′, so that the node n′ with more incoming
edges is still implied by R′ and the proof continues.
• If f = f ′, apparently we have that R implies the subtree
of n′.
We can continue the rule composition until we reach the root
so that each subtree in Tv is implied by a state consistent rule
in Bv .
Notice that the states are not properly transferred in the
rule that is labeled to the tree Tv , so we also need to re-
organize the states in the rule to form a valid state trace. Since
all the state duplications appear in the sub-tree are kept in
the resulting rule, we will merge them according to the state
transformation. Consider the root is labeled by a rule Rr, all
the states appeared in the tree Tv should be presented in Rr.
According to the derivation tree, some of the edges are labeled
by the same index. So we prove in the following iterations,
the resulting rule is still in Bv . The index starts with 1, which
is same index of the root, and it is increased by 1 after every
iteration. If currently the index is i, since the states in the
rule are corresponding to the states in the edge, so we can
merge the states in the edges labeled by i together. According
to the definition of the derivation tree, from the edges labeled
by i + 1 to the edges labeled by i, there exists a conversion
set C that converts some old states to the new states. Hence,
we could construct the mapping function m defined in the
state transformation, and map each c ∈ C to a set of states
that should be merged (the latest states for the latest state
transferring rule). After the state transformation, the largest
states in the rule now are labeled by index i+1. According to
Algorithm 1 case 2, the new rule should be also in Bv . Notice
that we have mentioned previously that some rules cannot be
composed because the incoming edge of the rule is labeled
by a singleton. Along with the state transformations, some
singleton may be unified to a non-singleton fact, so the rule
composition could continue.
In this way, the rule composition and the state transfor-
mation can be conducted until all states left are all labeled
by the largest index. If some inner edges are still labeled by
singletons, because the adversary can generate new names, he
can actively create a new value and label it to that edge, so
that he can drop the remaining sub-tree connected by that edge
and the remaining derivation tree is still valid. Since the facts
in leaves are the events and singletons, including those failed
with unification, the resulting rule is in the output knowledge
base B.
If. Whenever a rule is added into Bv , it should be com-
posed or transferred from existing rules. Thus all the rules in
Bv should be derivable from Binit. Meanwhile B does not
introduce extra rules besides existing rules in Bv , so ∀R′ ∈ B,
Algorithm 2: Query Contradiction Searching
Input : B - the knowledge base returned by Algorithm 1.
Input : e - the target event.
Output: b - if the event is reachable or not.
1 Algorithm
2 for f1, . . . , fn :M −[ S : O ]→ f ∈ B and f = e do
3 if ∃σ,∀s, s′ ∈ S, s ∼ s′ ⇒
4 σs = σs′ and σs is accessible then return true;
5 end
6 return false;
R′ is derivable from B.
B. Reachability Analysis
When the knowledge base is constructed, we need to check
if the target event is reachable or not. Given a rule in the base,
if the predicates are only events and singletons, the adversary
can fulfill them by asking the protocol to engage those events
and generate new names. For the remaining states in the rule,
we then need to check if the adversary has the access to
the corresponding object patterns. Assume the accessibility is
modeled as a set of state patterns P according to Section IV-D.
We define a state s as accessible to the adversary if ∃p ∈ P
such that ∃σ, σs = p. For instance, if the attack needs
a TPM tpm(cary[], p) from another participant Cary, while
Bob only have the access to the TPM from himself and not
preciously owned TPMs. Since there does not exist such a
substitution σ such that σtpm(cary[], p) = tpm(bob[], p′) or
σtpm(cary[], p) = tpm(aik, p′), the attack found is impracti-
cal. Thus, a query can be answered using a simple algorithm
as shown in Algorithm 2. It checks the target event against
all the remaining rules in the knowledge base B, and tries to
find a rule whose predicates can be fulfilled and states can
be accessed by the adversary. If there exists such a rule, the
algorithm returns true; otherwise it returns false. We prove the
partial correctness of our algorithm as follows.
Theorem 2. An event e is derivable from the initial rules Binit
if and only if there exists a rule in B such that its conclusion
is e and its states are all accessible to the adversary.
Proof. (If - Partial Soundness) If there is a rule in B that
outputs e. As the rules’ predicates are events and singletons,
the adversary can ask the protocol to engage those events and
generate new names to fulfill the singletons. When its states
in the same partition are unifiable and all unified states are
accessible to the adversary, the adversary can have the objects
to meet the requirements of those states. Hence, e is derivable
by the rule. According to Theorem 1’s if condition, e is also
derivable from Binit.
(Only if - Partial Completeness) If the event e is derivable
from Binit, according to Theorem 1’s only if condition, e is
also derivable from B. As the derivation tree is valid, the initial
states should be accessible states for the adversary.
Protocol ]Rulesa Result Time
DEP (w.o. reboot) [4] 318 Secure 6.2s
DEP (w. reboot) [4] 1409 Attack 12m 9.5s
Modified DEP [15] 1378 Secure 22m 17.7s
Bitlocker [11] 24 Secure 3ms
NSPK [18] 101 Attack 47ms
NSPK (Lowe) [19] 78 Secure 24ms
TABLE II: Experiment results
aThe number of rules generated by our solving algorithm for each protocol.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
Our engineering efforts has realized the proposed approach
in a tool named SSPA (Stateful Security Protocol Analyzer).
Our tool, all protocol models and evaluation results are
available online at [17]. SSPA is implemented in C++ with
around 11K LOC. The experiments presented in this section
are evaluated with Mac OS X 10.9.1, 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5
and 16G 1333MHz DDR3.
We have tested our tool with three versions of the DEP [4],
[15], the Bitlocker protocol [11] and two versions of the
Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NSPK) [18], [19].
All of the protocols are correctly analyzed within 30 minutes.
The results are summarized in Table II.
For the DEP example, when the TPM reboot is disallowed,
the verification result shows that Bob cannot obtain both of
the secret and the proof for his revoke action at the same
time. In the meanwhile, we also found several valid traces for
Bob to finish the protocol by either opening the envelope or
revoking his right. However, when the TPM reboot is allowed,
the claimed security property of the DEP is not preserved. In
addition to the attack trace described in Section III, SSPA also
found several other traces (attacking at different states), which
are similar variants to the attack described in Section III. The
modified version of the DEP presented in [15] is also proven
to be secure in our framework.
The Bitlocker [11] designed by Microsoft also uses TPM
to protect its execution state. In the machine equipped with
Bitlocker, the hard drive is assumed to be encrypted under a
volume encryption key (VEK). The VEK is in turn encrypted
by a volume master key (VMK). When the machine is booted,
an immutable pre-BIOS will load the BIOS and extend the
hash value of the BIOS into the TPM. The pre-BIOS then
passes the control to the BIOS. Later, the BIOS can load
other components by first extending the hash value of that
component into the TPM. The components then could in turn
load other components by doing this repeatedly, resulting in
a trust chain. Initially, the VMK is sealed by the TPM to a
certain PCR value corresponding to a correct boot state of the
machine. When the correct state is reached, the VMK can
be unsealed to decrypt the hard drive and access its data.
Even though the attacker could replace the BIOS and other
components in the machine, their hash values will not be
the same as the original ones. So the correct state cannot be
reached and the VMK remains secure. We model the protocol
by assuming that the attacker can read the VMK by either
replacing a fake BIOS or a fake loader (a component) in the
machine. Otherwise, the attacker cannot access the unsealed
data from the machine even if it is unsealed as it is controlled
by a trusted component. The verification result shows that
Bitlocker protects the VMK from the attacker even when the
BIOS and the loader can be replaced.
Lastly, we modeled the Needham-Schroeder Public Key
(NSPK) Protocol [18] and its fixed version by Gavin
Lowe [19]. We use these two examples to show that our
approach also works for stateless protocols. In order to model
the nonces exchanged by the participants in NSPK as random
numbers, we add two states for the participants when their first
message is sent and they are waiting for the second message
by treating them as trusted parties.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a new approach for the
stateful security protocol verification. Different from existing
tools in the literature, our approach allows for specifying state-
ful protocols directly (without modifications to the protocols)
and it can deal with infinite protocol states. Moreover, our
verification procedure is sound and complete if the solving
algorithm terminates. We have implemented a tool for our new
approach and validated it on a number of protocols. So far,
the initial results are encouraging.
When rules are newly composed in the knowledge base,
the redundancy checking consumes a large amount of time.
This is mainly because of the complexity of pairing states
and predicates from different rules and finding all possible
substitutions according to Definition 6. For the future work,
accelerating the redundancy checking would be very helpful
to accelerate the verification process dramatically. In addition,
analyzing more stateful protocols would be very interesting.
Moreover, adapting our approach to verify stateful protocols
with physical properties involved, e.g., time, space, etc. would
be promising as well.
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